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SELECTED OIL AND GAS DECISIONS 
 
Upstream – Federal  
 
S.D. Texas 
M-I L.L.C. v. Q'Max Sols., Inc., No. CV H-18-1099, 2019 WL 3565104 
(S.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2019). 
 
An upstream oil and gas company (“Previous Employer”) which developed 
hydraulic simulation software (“Software”) sued one of their former 
employees (“Employee”) for breach of contract. Previous Employer also 
sued Employee and his current employer (collectively “Current Employer”) 
for trade secret misappropriation. While working for Previous Employer, 
Employee signed a confidentiality agreement requiring him to maintain 
Previous Employer’s trade secrets confidential during and after his 
employment. After Employee left Previous Employer, Employee began 
working for his Current Employer. After Current Employer released a 
competing version of Previous Employer’s Software, Previous Employer 
discovered that Employee had copied and retained Previous Employer’s 
confidential information and was using it to help build Current Employer’s 
new product. After filing suit, Previous Employer filed a motion for summary 
judgment as to their claims against Employee and Current Employer. The 
Court denied Previous Employer’s motion regarding the trade secret 
misappropriation claim. The Court reasoned that questions of fact existed 
regarding whether the documents taken by Employee actually contained 
confidential information. The Court stated that Previous Employer’s motion 
only included generalizations, rather than specifics, regarding the 
independent value of the documents taken by Employee and of Previous 
Employer’s efforts to maintain the secrecy of their confidential information. 
The court further reasoned that questions of fact existed as to whether Current 
Employer actually used Previous Employer’s confidential information, as 
required by misappropriation claims. The Court granted Previous 
Employer’s summary judgment motion as to Employee’s breach of contract 
but left the issues of the scope of the breach and the damages for trial. 
Employee admitted to breaching the contract but raised the affirmative 
defenses of waiver and laches. The Court held that Employee’s affirmative 
defenses were inapplicable because Previous Employer promptly filed their 
action after learning that Employee had retained documents, and because 
Employee presented no evidence or argument to support his laches defense. 
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Upstream – State  
 
Alaska 
All Am. Oilfield, LLC v. Cook Inlet Energy, LLC, 446 P.3d 767 (Alaska 
2019). 
 
Oil Company contracted with Drilling Company for drilling services for 
numerous gas wells. Drilling Company successfully drilled and completed 
the gas wells. Oil Company never paid Drilling Company who filed liens 
against the wells and the natural gas within the reservoir itself before Oil 
Company filed bankruptcy. Drilling Company file a preferred mineral lien 
against the reservoir which the bankruptcy court found not to be valid and 
Drilling Company appealed. The Supreme Court of Alaska held that Drilling 
Company was not entitled to a preferred mineral lien because the natural gas 
had never been reduced to possession and thus did not fall within the ambit 
of the statute authorizing a preferred mineral lien. Additionally, the Court 
held that natural gas accumulating in a pipeline satisfies the preferred mineral 
lien statute as it has been reduced to possession and storage as required by 
the statute. Lastly, the Court held that the party seeking to enforce a preferred 
mineral lien must present evidence sufficient to show that the party’s labor 




Marcellus Shale Coal. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. 573 M.D. 2016, 2019 WL 
3268820 (Pa. Commw. Ct. July 22, 2019). 
 
Natural Gas Industry Organization (“Organization”) sought preliminary 
enforcement review against Department of Environmental Protection 
(“DEP”) for passing a rule regulating hydraulic fracturing in unconventional 
wells. On remand from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, this court heard 
cross-applications for summary relief. The court held that (1) DEP could not 
establish a clear right for relief from Organization’s claims that DEP exceed 
its statutory authority when promulgating certain provisions of the rules 
relating to pollution monitoring and remediation requirements; (2) contrary 
to Organization’s claims, the rule’s permitting, bonding, and notice 
requirements did not conflict with other state law; (3) while DEP had 
statutory authority to regulate waste storage permitting and set standards for 
well development impoundments, the arguments presented were not 
sufficient to warrant relief for either side on the issue of the constitutionality 
of the well development impoundment standards; (4) DEP’s rulemaking 
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concerning site restoration requirements was issued under its statutory 
authority, was not so vague or facially ambiguous as to render it 
unenforceable, was issued according to the necessary procedures, and was 
not unreasonable; (5) the rule’s spill remediation requirements posed no 
perceivable threat to the industry warranting the court’s pre-enforcement 
intervention; and (6) the rule’s waste reporting requirements was 
promulgated pursuant to DEP’s statutory authority and did not conflict with 
other state law. For the above reasons, the court granted the cross-
applications in part and denied in part.  
 
Midstream – Federal 
 
D. Kansas 
Panel Specialists, Inc. v. Tenawa Haven Processing, LLC, No. 5:16-CV-
04140-HLT, 2019 WL 3716451 (D. Kan. Aug. 7, 2019). 
 
Instrumentation and electrical (“E&I”) services company (“Services 
Company”) brought action against a midstream natural gas processing 
company (“Processor”) based on a contract between the parties regarding 
construction of Processor’s new facility. Services Company asserted a breach 
of contract based on Processor’s failure to fully pay, and Processor 
counterclaimed failure to pay was due to Services Company unreasonably 
marking up their E&I invoices. Both parties proffered expert testimony 
regarding the invoice markups, and moved to exclude the other’s expert 
testimony. The Court denied Service Company’s motion to exclude 
Processor’s expert testimony which alleged Service Company’s markups 
were unreasonably excessive. The court found Processor’s expert testimony 
to be based on industry knowledge and experience from the relevant market, 
as well as from the expert’s personal involvement on the project. The Court 
held that this testimony would be useful to the jury, who would determine 
credibility, regarding the industry customs on reasonable E&I invoice 
markups. The Court went on to exclude only a portion of Service Company’s 
rebuttal expert testimony, which introduced new legal issues not pertaining 
to the rebuttal of Processor’s expert testimony on E&I markups. The Court 
excluded Service Company’s expert testimony regarding the importance of 
reviewing E&I invoices for accuracy, because Service Company’s expert 
was only designated to proffer testimony about the invoice markups. The 
Court allowed Service Company’s expert to offer rebuttal testimony as to the 
reasonableness of the markups because the expert testified based off of 
industry knowledge and experience which would be useful to the jury. The 
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Court concluded by stating that either party could re-raise the issue later in 
the case, after the Court heard the complete testimony of both experts. 
 
Midstream – State 
 
Texas 
McDonald Oilfield Operations, LLC v. 3B Inspection, LLC, No. 01-18-
00118-CV, 2019 WL 3330966 (Tex. App. July 25, 2019). 
 
Pipeline Inspection Company (“Company”) was sued by Competing Pipeline 
Inspection Company (“Competitor”) after Competitor hired independent 
contractor previously employed by Company. Competitor brought claims 
under theories of business disparagement, defamation, and tortious 
interference with contract, alleging that Company made disparaging remarks 
about Competitor to Competitor’s client. Company unsuccessfully moved to 
dismiss Competitor’s claims pursuant to the Texas Citizens Participation Act 
(“TCPA”). An appellate opinion followed and Company successfully 
motioned for a rehearing. Upon rehearing, this court reversed and remanded 
back to the trial court. Under the TCPA, the trial court was obligated to 
dismiss Competitor’s claims upon proof that the litigation was brought in 
response to Company’s exercise of their right to free speech, unless 
Competitor establishes a prima facie case for each claim by clear and specific 
evidence. First, the court held that the TCPA was triggered because 
Company’s alleged statements regarded the independent contractor’s 
operator qualifications. Thus, Company was exercising their right to free 
speech because Company’s statements implicated public safety issues and 
were related to a matter of public concern. Second, the court held that 
Competitor’s claims were merely supported by conclusory statements, and 
thus insufficient to establish a prima facie case by clear and specific evidence. 
For these reasons, the court reversed and remanded, concluding that the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying Company’s motion to dismiss pursuant 
to the TCPA.  
 
Pearl Energy Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Gravitas Res. Corp., No. 05-18-01012-CV, 
2019 WL 3729501 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 7, 2019). 
 
An oil and gas production company (“Production Company”) sued a private 
equity firm, an investment fund, and one of the fund’s portfolio companies 
(collectively, “Private Equity Firm”). Production Company spent 
considerable time and resources researching a potential property acquisition, 
which they developed a confidential financial report over. After an NDA was 
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signed, Production Company shared their report with Private Equity Firm, 
hoping Private Equity Firm’s fund would help finance their acquisition. 
Private Equity Firm then communicated the confidential information from 
Production Company’ report to their portfolio company and proceeded to 
purchase the property out from under the Production Company, using the 
information from the confidential report. Private Equity Firm filed a motion 
to dismiss Production Company's claims pursuant to the Texas Citizens 
Participation Act (“TCPA”), which was denied by the trial court. This 
prompted the Private Equity Firm to appeal to the Court of Appeals of Texas. 
On appeal, the Court affirmed the trial courts denial of Private Equity Firm’s 
motion to dismiss. The Court reasoned that the purpose of the TCPA, on 
which Private Equity Firm based their motion, was to dispose of lawsuits 
designed to inhibit the first amendment rights of others. The Private Equity 
Firm’s communication of the confidential report was not protected as a right 
of association under the TCPA because it did not concern the public good or 
citizen participation. The Court reasoned that construing the Private Equity 
Firms’ communication as protected by the TCPA, merely because the Private 
Equity Firms communicated it to their portfolio company with a shared 
common interest, would not further the legislative goals of the TCPA. 
Further, the Court held that the Private Equity Firm’s communications were 
not protected as free speech under the TCPA because they did not involve a 
matter of public concern, but only the Private Equity Firms’ own financial 
interests. For these reasons, the Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of 
Private Equity Firms’ motion to dismiss pursuant to the TCPA. 
 
Downstream – Federal 
 
8th Circuit 
Kodiak Oil & Gas (USA) Inc. v. Burr, 932 F.3d 1125 (8th Cir. 2019). 
 
Tribe Members brought suit against Oil Company in tribal court alleging 
waste of natural gas through flaring and sought damages in terms of lost 
royalty payments for the flared natural gas. Oil Company contested tribal 
court jurisdiction but the tribal court found jurisdiction proper because Oil 
Company voluntarily entered into a contractual relationship with Tribe 
Members. Oil Company brought suit in federal district court seeking 
injunction to stop tribal court from exercising jurisdiction. The district court 
granted the injunction finding that tribal court cannot exercise jurisdiction 
over nonmembers. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s injunction blocking tribal court jurisdiction 
holding: (1) oil and gas leases on tribal land are wholly regulated by the 
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federal government so any regulatory actions by tribal court would be 
preempted; (2) tribal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction so they 
cannot hear federal question claims; (3) tribal officials could not avoid the 
injunction via sovereign immunity as the Oil Company was just seeking an 
injunction, not monetary damages. 
 
D. Kansas 
Hitch Enterprises v. Oxy USA Inc., No. 18-1030-EFM-KGG, 2019 WL 
3202257 (D. Kan. July 16, 2019). 
 
Well Owners (“Owners”) sued Well Operator (“Operator”) alleging Operator 
breached its lease because Operator underpaid royalties by wrongly 
deducting a portion of production costs from royalties.  Operator removed 
case to federal court and Owners moved to certify a class of royalty owners 
in Kansas wells. Operator opposed the class certification and subsequently 
moved for partial summary judgment. The court denied Owners’ motion to 
certify based on several findings. First, because the court concluded that in-
Kansas gas can be marketable before it is marketed in a good faith transaction 
action, Owners’ breach of duty argument cannot be resolved without 
evaluating individualized evidence. Second, Owners failed to present a 
determinative common question regarding deduction of costs from royalties. 
Third, Owners’ proposed common question regarding Operator and 
Affiliate’s payment of royalties was not common to the entire proposed class. 
Fourth, Owners’ proposed common question that Operator failed to pay 
interest on refunded Conservation Fees was too minor to justify certification. 
Operator moved for partial summary judgment on three grounds: (1) all 
breach of contract claims based on deductions taken from July 1, 2007 to 
January 11, 2013 were barred by the statute of limitations; (2) Owners were 
not entitled to 10% interest on refunded Conservation Fees; (3) Operator 
already paid Owners royalties for all fuel used or lost in the field or at the 
plant. On the first ground, the court denied summary judgment because 
Operator was equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations 
defense. On the second ground, the court granted summary judgment because 
Owners were entitled to an interest rate of prime plus 1.5% pursuant to 
Kansas statute. On the third ground, the court granted summary judgment 
because Owners did not contest the issue.  
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Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 2:17-cv-
120 WBS CKD, 2019 WL 3231748 (D. Cal. July 17, 2019).  
 
Irrigation District brought action against the United States Army Corps of 
Engineers (USACE) alleging a breach of a construction contract. This 
dispute arose because of a failure to construct an irrigation facility according 
to the contract’s specifications which were required in the Project 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA). The PCA required the USACE to contribute 
a minimum of 25% of total project costs for the facility. The focus of the 
USACE’s motion concerns bank stabilization near River Mile 208. The PCA 
stated that the government may “carry out bank stabilization work in the 
riverbed gradient facility. . .if the Assistant Secretary of the Army determines 
that such work is necessary to protect the overall integrity of the project. The 
USACE never determined that bank stabilization work was necessary. 
Consequently, Irrigation District brought action against the government 
alleging that the PCA had been breached by failing to construct the gradient 
facility according to the PCA’s specifications. The court noted that federal 
law governs contract interpretation where the United States is a party, and 
that contract interpretation starts with the language of the written agreement. 
After applying this rule, the court reasoned that the contract at issue in this 
case, define the obligations of the parties and the scope of the gradient facility 
project, however, nothing in the contract mentions an obligation related to 
bank stabilization of River Mile 208. Further, the court found that the 
authorization for the engineering and environmental work mentioned in the 
contract was an exercise of the Assistant Secretary’s discretion. The 
Irrigation District contended that the government used funds for the project, 
and also that the government would not have performed the work if it did no 
have an obligation to. However, these contentions do not establish that River 
Mile 208 was the subject of any contractual obligations. Consequently, the 








Cent. Sierra Envtl. Res. Ctr. v. Stanislaus Nat’l Forest, No. 1:17-cv-00441-
LJO-SAB, 2019 WL 3564155 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2019). 
 
Environmental Group brought suit against Forest Service challenging a 
permitting scheme regulating cattle grazing on allotted National Forest land. 
Environmental Group filed for summary judgment on multiples claims and 
Forest Service filed cross-motions for summary judgment in response. 
Environmental Group’s first claim for relief centered around violations of the 
Clean Water Act (“CWA”), including violations of water-quality standards 
as a result of grazing and a failure to file proper reports concerning grazing 
discharges. The court rejected Environmental Group’s claims because Forest 
Service’s ongoing regulatory efforts to reduce water quality violations were 
reasoned and not arbitrary and capricious. Furthermore, under the 
Management Agency Agreement (“MAA”) Forest Service is not required to 
file notices of discharge or obtain permits. Environmental Group’s second 
claim for relief alleged Forest Service violated the National Forest 
Management Act (“NFMA”) because it failed to comply with provisions of 
a forest and resource plan. The court found that Forest Service’s general 
compliance with short-term and long-term forest plan standards and 
guidelines advanced the goals of the forest plan and was a reasonable 
interpretation of the forest plan. Additionally, the court found Forest Service 
is owed significant deference in determining the methodology it uses to 
measure forest data because of its agency expertise. The court thus denied 
Environmental Group’s motion for summary judgment and granted Forest 





Barclay Hollander Corp. v. Cal. Reg’l Water Quality Control Bd., No. 
B284182, 38 Cal.App.5th 479, (Cal. Ct. App. 2019), reh’g denied (Aug. 27, 
2019). 
 
This case concerned Water Quality Control Board’s (“Board”) determination 
that Developer was jointly and severally responsible for the cleanup up of 
petroleum contaminants on a housing site where Developer had constructed 
and sold homes. Developer sought a reversal of judgment of the Los Angeles 
Superior Court denying its petition seeking to overturn the determination, 
alleging the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and its Bill of Rights 
should have applied to Board’s proceedings and due process violations. The 
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appellate court affirmed the L.A. Superior Court’s decision for several 
reasons. First, Developer failed to allege a statutory basis for the application 
of APA hearing procedures to Developer’s claim. Second, Developer’s 
waived its opportunity for a formal hearing because it failed to object in a 
timely manner to informal proceedings. Third, Developer mistakenly 
asserted with no statutory basis that the California Legislature engrafted the 
APA into the Code of Civil Procedure. Finally, in weighing due process 
principles, the appellate court concluded that Developer was afforded 
appropriate due process because Developer had opportunities to fully express 
its views and address its interests and the substantial governmental interest 
in water quality. 
 
Maryland 
Md. Dep’t of the Env’t v. Cty. Comm’rs, Nos. 5, 7, Sept. Term, 2018, 2019 
WL 3561897 (Md. Aug. 6, 2019). 
 
County 1 and County 2 appealed for judicial review of municipal storm sewer 
permits issued by Department of the Environment (“Department”) that, for 
the most part, upheld Department action. The appellate court upheld 
Department permits holding that (1) a challenge to a permit term derived 
from a Total Maximum Daily Load (“TMDL”) can only be raised in an action 
reviewing the EPA’s approval of that TMDL because that action is 
reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”); (2) the 
Impervious Surface Restoration Requirement (“ISRR”) was consistent with 
the EPA’s interpretation of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) because the CWA 
permits agencies to include water quality limitations without referring to the 
Maximum Extent Practicable (“MEP”) standard; (3) the inclusion of the 
ISRR was not arbitrary and capricious because it was consistent with area 
TMDLs, and the Department adequately addressed issues raised by County 
2; (4) the Department did not exceed its authority under the CWA through 
ISSR county-wide baselines because county-wide baselines were necessary 
to achieve water quality standards; (5) Counties’ arguments alleging 
restoration planning requirements exceeded the scope of the Department’s 
authority could only have been raised in a challenge to the EPA’s approval 
of the TMDL; (6) Counties cannot be relegated to a Phase II permit with less 
stringent regulations because Counties have been treated as Phase I 
jurisdictions for over thirty years and a change in distinction risks 
backsliding, among other reasons; (7) Department’s failure to approve water 
quality trading in Counties’ permits was not arbitrary and capricious because 
it occurred before the Department concluded ongoing review regarding water 
quality trading; (8) permit terms regarding future development do not 
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override State statutes because they do not restrict the Counties’ obligation 
to cooperate with other entities under State law. 
 
Michigan 
Gottleber v. City. of Saginaw, No. 336011, 2019 WL 3521832 (Mich. Ct. 
App. Aug. 1, 2019). 
 
This case is an inverse condemnation action that was reviewed on remand.  
County of Saginaw (“County”) purchased land adjoining Landowner’s parcel 
to serve as a Dredged Material Disposal Facility (“DMDF”). To combat the 
environmental effect of the DMDF, County also built a Wetland Mitigation 
Area (“WMA”). Landowner asserted that the WMA construction by County 
caused flooding on his land. This case was heard on remand from the 
Michigan Supreme Court to determine the following issues: (1) whether 
County had the legal duty to continue artificially pumping and draining water 
on its land for the benefit of Landowner; and (2) If such duty does not exist, 
whether County had abused its powers by affirmatively taking actions that 
were aimed at Landowner’s property. On the first issue, the appellate court 
held that County does not have a legal duty to maintain an artificial water 
level on its land for Landowner’s benefits. Landowner cannot complain that 
County does not maintain water on its land the same way a prior owner had.  
But, even though County is under no obligation to maintain artificial water 
level, County cannot divert the natural flow of surface water on its land so as 
to impose on one person what would have belonged to another. On the second 
issue, the court found that County did abuse its legitimate powers, meaning 
Landowner can proceed to trial on its inverse condemnation claim. By 
removing the existing drainage system and halting pumping activities in 
order to construct the WMA (all affirmative actions), County altered the 
natural flow of water and concentrated it in an adjacent area to Landowner’s 
property.   
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state (or federal) court 
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.  
 
Montana 
United States Dep't of Army Corps of Eng’rs v. United States Dep't of Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 2019 MT 174, 396 Mont. 433, 445 P.3d 828. 
 
This case is about a dispute between Fort Peck, a town plagued with 
population decline (“Town”), and State on the correct water volume Town 
can claim. Town claimed 773 acre per year (“AFY”), while State 
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recommended 206 AFY. Both parties entered a joint pretrial order to 
determine the correct water volume. The Water Court set Town’s volume at 
171 AFY, and Town appealed with the following issues: (1) The Water Court 
erred in its contradiction of the pretrial order; (2) Water Court erred when it 
based its volume determination on current use, instead of Town’s historical 
use and anticipated future use; and (3) Town was denied due process because 
it was not provided an opportunity to present evidence on its current water 
use. Town lost on all claims. First, the purpose of a pretrial order is to 
simplify issues and prevent surprises. In its phrasing of the pretrial order, the 
Water Court clearly provided notice to the parties that there will be a broader 
inquiry than what was in the pretrial order, and neither party objected. 
Second, State provided enough evidence that the volume amount claimed by 
Town was more than the amount needed to satisfy its current use plus future 
use. Historical use alone is not the basis of volume determination. Town’s 
long history of water volume non-use was rightly considered by the Water 
Court. Lastly, Water Court’s records indicated several exhibits were 
introduced at trial, which reflected Town’s current water use. Thus, Town’s 
due process was not violated, as it had adequate notice that its current water 
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Boucher v. United State Dep’t of Agric., 934 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2019).  
 
Property Owner petitioned for a review of a United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) determination that her property was converted wetland, 
which effectively rendered her ineligible for governmental benefits. USDA 
asserted that nine tree removals by Property Owner converted several acres 
of wetland into cropland. The district court agreed, and the Seventh Circuit 
reversed. First, the appellate court held in favor of Property Owner because 
USDA ignored compelling evidence offered by Property Owner showing that 
her property never qualified as a wetland. To determine whether a property 
qualifies as wetland, USDA must assess whether there is a predominance of 
hydrophotic vegetation, a prevalence of hydric soils, and wetland hydrology 
under normal circumstances. Property Owner’s property does not meet any 
of the elements needed to classify her site as a wetland. Second, USDA’s 
classification of Property Owner’s property did not make any rational 
connection with the facts found by Property Owner and, instead, was based 
on an erroneous assumption. USDA’s agent assumed that hydrology on 
Property Owner’s property had been drained via the installation of tile. 
Property Owner repeatedly refuted this assumption with valid evidence, but 
such evidence was intentionally ignored by USDA. Third, USDA never sent 
a hydrologist to inspect Property Owner’s property throughout the 
administration process, despite the fact that hydrology was at the heart of the 
dispute.  Finally, USDA’s assertion that removal of woody hydrophotic 
vegetation from hydric soil is sufficient to deem the site a converted wetland 
is an overreach and runs contrary to the definition’s focus of hydrology. 
Overall, USDA’s actions in the administrative process with Property Owner 
was arbitrary, capricious, and represented a blatant abuse of discretion.  
 
W.D. Louisiana 
Precht v. Columbia Gulf Transmission, LLC, No. 2:18-CV-0853, 2019 WL 
3368600 (W.D. La. July 24, 2019) 
 
Farmers claimed to have a verbally created farm lease over lands owned by 
Lessor. Lessor entered into a Right of Way Agreement (“ROWA”) with 
Pipeline Company, granting Pipeline Company permission to create a 
pipeline across the farmland, while Farmers allege their lease was already in 
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existence. In the ROWA, Pipeline Company promised to pay for any 
damages to crops caused by pipeline construction. On the day the ROWA 
was executed, Lessor signed a release of all claims against Pipeline Company 
(“Release”). Farmers filed suit for damages to their farming operations 
caused by the pipeline construction. The parties then filed cross motions for 
summary judgment (“MSJ”). Pipeline Company argued the release barred 
Farmers’ claims for damages under the ROWA, and Farmers’ trespass claims 
failed because they could not establish ownership of the damaged crops. The 
Court ruled that the release was valid, despite lacking relevant restrictions, 
but because the Release was restricted to claims brought by Lessor, and not 
Farmers as Lessor’s tenants, the Release did not restrict the Farmers’ claims 
as third-party beneficiaries to the ROWA. The Court then held that, because 
the damages promise made by Pipeline Company did not restrict 
beneficiaries of the promise to Lessor, Farmers could claim a benefit under 
the promise as a third-party beneficiary to the ROWA. However, because 
questions of fact existed regarding the Lessor’s agent’s authority to enact the 
lease with Farmers, the Farmers’ MSJ for damages as third-party 
beneficiaries to the ROWA was denied. The Court granted Pipeline 
Company’s MSJ regarding Farmers’ trespass claim, because Farmers could 
not show separate ownership over the crops trespassed on. This was due to 
separate ownership not having been established by an instrument, as 
Farmers’ lease was verbal and was never recorded. 
 
D. North Dakota 
Wachter Dev., Inc. v. Martin, No. 20180379, 2019 WL 3421911 (D.N.D. 
July 30, 2019).  
 
Realtor purchased land from Developer. Before Realtor obtained a warranty 
deed from Developer, Realtor sold a portion of the land to Purchaser. Prior 
to delivering the warranty deed to Realtor, Developer recorded a Declaration 
for Restriction and Obligation (DRO), which included a no fence restriction. 
Purchaser appealed a district court ruling that ordered a removal of a dog run 
on his property, because the dog run violated the DRO’s no fence restrictions. 
Purchaser lost on all of the following raised issues: (1) the DRO was not 
applicable to Purchaser’s property under the doctrine of equitable 
conversion; (2) Developer could not enforce the DRO because Developer 
waived its rights; and (3) the DRO was unconscionable. On the first issue, 
the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the doctrine of equitable 
conversion was inapplicable to Purchaser. For equitable conversion to apply, 
one must have a fee simple title. In this case, Purchaser was constructively 
notified that Realtor’s agreement to convey a fee simple title was conditioned 
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upon Realtor acquiring a fee simple title from Developer. Therefore, because 
Developer recorded the DRO prior to Realtor acquiring its fee simple title, 
Purchaser was bounded by the terms in the DRO as a covenant that runs with 
the land. Secondly, Purchaser was precluded from claiming that Developer 
waived its right to sue because a “no waiver” provision was included in the 
DRO. The no waiver provision was clear, barring Purchaser from raising the 
defense of acquiescence or waiver. Finally, the DRO was not 
unconscionable. Even though procedural unconscionability may have existed 
since the homeowners were not afforded the opportunity to negotiate the 
terms of the DRO, the DRO nevertheless contained no surprise component 





Save the Hill v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, No. CPF-16515238, 2019 WL 
3284589 (Cal. Ct. App. July 22, 2019). 
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should 
be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
Environmental Organizations (EO) appealed a denial of their petition for writ 
of mandate against the City’s environmental impact report’s (EIR) 
certification for a development plan. They also appeal the findings of the 
infeasibility of an alternative project under the California Environmental 
Quality Act (CEQA). The court considered the original agency’s action 
under de novo review. The purpose of an EIR under CEQA is whether it 
includes enough detail to be understood by those outside of the project and 
whether it allows consideration of issues raised by the project. The court does 
not require scientific certainty but rather a good-faith effort at full disclosure. 
EO questioned the adequacy of EIR because certain issues were not 
addressed. However, EO failed to provide substantial evidence that there are 
reasonably foreseeable impacts not addressed by EIR. EO also contended 
that EIR was insufficient in its analysis of impact on traffic. However, EIR 
included the required analysis and outlined potential traffic mitigation 
measures. City determined by substantial evidence that alternative plans were 
infeasible. A determination of feasibility includes economic, social, 
environmental, and technological factors. Determinations by agencies are 
given great deference and presumed correct. The burden of overturning such 
determinations is upon the party seeking writ of mandate, which was not met 
here. 
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Minn. Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy v. Minn. Dept. of Nat. Res., No. A18-1956, 
2019 WL 3545839 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2019). 
 
Environmental Group sought a declaratory judgment on the rule governing 
nonferrous mineral mining in Minnesota. In 2018, Government Agency 
issued the first permit for copper-nickel-platinum mine. Environmental 
Group sought to invalidate the administrative rules under which the permit 
was issued. The court stated the statutory grant of standing is broad, and those 
within the class of persons an act protects have standing. Government 
Agency contended that the statute of limitations and doctrine of laches allow 
for dismissal. The court stated, statute of limitations applies to declaratory 
judgments in the same extent as similar non-declaratory judgments. The rule 
in question has a unique statutory remedy, and there is no comparable non-
declaratory action to derive a statute of limitations. Therefore, the court 
denied Government Agency’s contention that the residual statute of 
limitations should apply. The court declined to apply the doctrine of laches 
to bar this action because laches is a discretionary doctrine whose application 
is infrequent in environmental litigation because often there are numerous 
parties injured. The court then went on to discuss the requirements for a court 
to declare a rule invalid. The rule must be: (1) in violation of the constitution, 
(2) exceed statutory authorization, or (3) be adopted through non-compliance 
with requisite steps for rulemaking. The court held that the rule exceeds 
statutory authority because the legislature instructed agencies to develop 
rules that emphasize agency goals while remaining flexible. Additionally, the 
general guidelines of the rule allow the court to conclude the rule does not 
abuse statutory authority through the commissioner’s discretion. 
Environmental Group contends the rule is unconstitutional for vagueness. 
The court dismissed this contention by discussing the rule that another party 
may not assert another’s constitutional rights. Additionally, the court held 
that Environmental Group provided no authority supporting environmental 
protection and property enjoyment as constitutionally protected property 
interests. Furthermore, the commissioner’s discretion is not vague, as the 
permitting process provides definite requirements for a mine to receive a 
permit. Lastly, the court noted that the rule challenged was bettered suited 








Sullivan v. Maddox, No. 2011-CT-00820-COA, 2019 WL 3423397 (Miss. 
Ct. App. July 30, 2019).  
 
Landowners sued Neighbor in an effort to prevent Neighbor from entering 
Landowners’ property. In response, Neighbor asserted that he had an 
easement over Landowners’ property. Many issues were raised, and the 
Mississippi Court of Appeal affirmed the following: (1) Chancellor’s 
dismissal for failure to prosecute, and Chancellor’s dismissal of Landowners’ 
complaint with prejudice; (2) Chancellor’s award of sanctions; and (3) 
Chancellor’s judgement that Neighbor did not have an easement. 
Landowners argued that the Chancellor’s dismissal of its claim for failure to 
prosecute was entered without reasonable notice, and thus affected their 
opportunity to be heard. The appellate court disagreed, citing that not every 
order given without notice is an automatic violation of due process. A district 
court has an inherent power to dismiss for failure to prosecute, in order to 
efficiently manage its docket. The complaint’s dismissal with prejudice was 
also affirmed because the record indicated that Landowners purposefully 
delayed the case over time through different tactics. Next, Chancellor was 
within his discretion in awarding sanctions because the sanction was a result 
of various dilatory conduct the court frowns upon. Finally, the appellate court 
affirmed the ruling that Neighbor did not have an easement of record or 
easement by implication/necessity. The court also noted that the Chancellor 
was within his discretion in reviewing a previous motion for recusal and other 
information while determining sanctions. There was no easement of record 
because Neighbor knew or should have known that the only way to access 
his property was via the other adjoining land he owned at the time of 
purchase. There was no easement by necessity, partly because there are 
multiple ways that Neighbor could use to access his property.  
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state (or federal) court 
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.  
 
New Jersey 
Tecza v. Barone, Nos. A-5143-17T1, A-5306-17T1, 2019 WL 3282983 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 22, 2019). 
 
Construction Company demolished a small house on a lot and thereafter sold 
the lot to Homeowner. Adjacent Homeowner experienced water runoff on 
his property as a result of the house removal. Following the sale, Adjacent 
Homeowner’s basement and yard frequently flooded. Adjacent Homeowner 
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brought suit to abate the nuisance. Previous law in New Jersey treated water 
as a common enemy that may be removed from property by any means 
without regard to neighboring property. However, the governing law now is 
that landowners owe a duty to not cause a nuisance by ridding water from 
their land onto that of their neighbors. Construction Company had created 
the nuisance by its demolition of the house. Homeowner was negligent by 
not taking the necessary action to correct the nuisance. Construction 
Company argued the New Jersey Supreme Court had ruled on this issue in a 
recent case. However, that case was distinguished because the defendant 
there did not act intentionally nor could have. Homeowner was on notice by 
Adjacent Homeowner of the flooding issue. Adjacent Homeowner prevailed 
at jury trial and the matter was handed to a Chancery judge to determine 
equitable relief. Adjacent Homeowner requested new drywells be installed 
to abate the nuisance. Construction Company again attempted to characterize 
the issue as one of Plaintiff’s land, using an expert rather than presenting how 
the nuisance could be abated, which the Chancery Judge treated as an attempt 
at nullifying the jury’s findings. With only one plan presented, the Chancery 
judge endorsed Adjacent Homeowner’s plan. 
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should 
be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
Ohio 
City of Cincinnati v. Triton Servs., Inc., No. C-170705, 2019-Ohio-3108, 
2019 WL 3521934 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2019).  
 
City sued General Contractor for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. 
City contracted with General Contractor for different sewer works, Project 1 
and Project 2. Under Project 1, City accidentally paid General Contractor 
twice for its services. After City’s multiple requests for General Contractor 
to return the original payment proved to be futile, City sued General 
Contractor for unjust enrichment. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the 
trial court’s ruling in favor of City. The double payment unjustly enriched 
General Contractor, and General Contractor’s argument that it should be able 
to take advantage of City’s mistake was meritless. On Project 2, General 
Contractor experienced delays due to unanticipated soil conditions.  General 
Contractor sued City to recover unpaid contract balance and unabsorbed 
home office overhead. City countersued under spoliation of evidence 
doctrine, stating that General Contractor did not collect or preserve the soil 
samples needed for rebuttal. City further requested that the trial court exclude 
testimony of one of General Contractor’s employee. The trial court ruled in 
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City’s favor for both claims, and the appellate court reversed. First, the 
contract between City and General Contractor did not show that General 
Contractor had a duty to collect or preserve soil samples. Therefore, because 
no duty was imposed, there was no evidence that existed to be destroyed. 
Second, the trial court erred in excluding testimony of General Contractor’s 
employee. General Contractor’s testimony would not have caused City any 
unfair prejudice because the testimony would have appealed to a jury’s 
intellect rather than to emotions that invoke an instinct to punish. General 
Contractor lost on its unabsorbed home office overhead claim; however, it 
lost because it failed to meet the prima facie element of being on standby and 
not being able to retain any work while on standby.  
 
Texas 
Ohio Dev., LLC v. Tapatio Springs Homeowners Ass'n, No. 04-18-00523-
CV, 2019 WL 3432104 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 31, 2019). 
 
Development Company (“Developer”) purchased a property (“Property”) 
that shared a boundary line via a long strip of land (the “Strip) with a property 
owned by Homeowners Association (“HOA”).  Developer filed an 
application seeking approval to develop Property, but its application was 
denied because Developer failed to show that it had access to cross the Strip. 
Developer commenced a declaratory judgement against HOA, stating 
amongst others, that it had an established easement to use the Strip to access 
Property. The trial court granted judgement in HOA’s favor. Texas Court of 
Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that Developer can cross 
the Strip because the Strip had an easement appurtenant. An easement 
appurtenant runs with the land. Unlike a gross easement, the benefit of an 
easement appurtenant are not personal to an individual. In concluding that 
the Strip, which was eventually conveyed to Developer, had an easement 
appurtenant, the appellate court examined prior deed conveyances, including 
a 1982 declaration that the Strip was subjected under. The 1982 declaration 
contained language that stated that a perpetual right of non-exclusive 
easement and right of way existed that will run with the land, binding on all 
future successors and assigns.  The purpose of the easement was to provide 
vehicular and pedestrian access to adjoining and neighboring land, which is 
applicable in this case. 
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Wagenschein v. Ehlinger, No. 13-17-00515-CV, 2019 WL 3048462 (Tex. 
App.—Corpus Christi July 1, 2019). 
 
Successors to rights of one grantor (“Successors”) brought an action for 
reformation of a warranty deed against surviving grantors (“Grantors”). The 
trial court granted the Grantors’ motion for summary judgment regarding the 
construction of a mineral interest reservation (“Reservation”) in the deed. 
Successors appealed to the Court of Appeals of Texas.  Successors asserted 
the Reservation created a tenancy in common, rather than the previously used 
interpretation of a joint tenancy. Grantors filed a cross-MSJ declaring that 
the Reservation created a joint tenancy in the surviving grantors, and that the 
Successors were estopped from bringing their claims. The Court held that the 
Successors were estopped from taking a position inconsistent with a 
previously held position from which they had benefited. The Court reasoned 
the Successors had previously and affirmatively signed amended deed 
division orders consistent with a joint tenancy, which entitled them to an 
increase in their interest from the Reservation. The Court further reasoned 
that Successors were not strangers to the transaction, as they were bound by 
the same deed which had bound their ancestors, and therefore estoppel 
applied. The Successors further argued that the interpretation of the deed 
created a tenancy in common, because a provision in the deed stated that 
interest in the Reservation would go to the “Grantors and Grantors’ 
successors….” The Court disagreed, holding the interpretation of the deed 
unambiguously created a tenancy in common. The Court reasoned that in 
order to give effect to the entire deed, the term “successors” was synonymous 
with the term “survivors” which was used in the Reservations opening and 




Estate of Price v. Hodkin, No. 20170279-CA, 2019 UT App 137, 447 P.3d 
1285. 
 
Claimant sought quiet title to the mineral rights of two parcels, the deeds to 
which had been recorded forty-seven years before. The surface and mineral 
rights for both parcels were originally owned by two sisters as joint tenants 
with rights of survivorship. No other deeds were recorded for the parcels and 
one sister died in 1966, meaning that the rights to the surface and minerals of 
both parcels should have passed to the surviving sister. However, that did not 
happen. The executor for the deceased sister made a deal with the surviving 
sister: the surviving sister would get the surface interest in exchange for 
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forgiving a debt of the estate. The mineral rights were expressly left out of 
the deal. A new deed was executed pursuant to the deal in 1966. The proceeds 
from the retained mineral rights funneled into a testamentary trust, which 
named the deceased sister’s daughters as beneficiaries. The surviving sister 
continued to make payments into the trust until her death in 1977. The new 
owner, Claimant, made a few payments to the trust as well, until bringing 
this initial action against Beneficiaries in 2013. Claimant argues that the 
original joint tenancy with rights of survivorship never severed, such that she 
is entitled to the entire surface and mineral estate as a matter of law. 
Beneficiaries claim that the 1966 deal effectively severed the joint tenancy, 
and even if it did not, this quiet title action is barred by laches and estoppel. 
Beneficiaries claim that, because Claimant made payments to the trust and 
did not bring suit for forty-seven years, Claimant acted in accordance with 
the new deed. Because Beneficiaries showed that (1) Claimant “failed to 
diligently pursue its claim,” and (2) Beneficiaries were injured by the delay 
due to loss of evidence and surviving parties to the original deeds, the court 
found that Claimant’s action was barred by laches.  
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Cloverland Elec. Coop. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No. 342552, 2019 WL 
3307893 (Mich. Ct. App. July 23, 2019). 
 
Electric Company appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals in response 
to the judgement that a state reliability mechanism (“SRM”) fee be imposed 
on their full-service customers. The suit was in response to the State passing 
legislation requiring Alternative Electric Suppliers (“AES”) to demonstrate 
that they can provide adequate capacity for their customer’s electricity 
demands. If an AES is unable to provide adequate capacity, Electric 
Company would, in this case, be required to supply the deficit and impose an 
SRM fee on the AES’s customers. Electric Company sued Public Service 
Commission (“PSC”) after PSC ordered Electric Company to charge an SRM 
fee on all of its full-service member customers, not just the full-service 
member customers who purchased electricity from an AES. On review, the 
court (1) rejected Electric Company’s argument that PSC overstepped its 
statutory authority and held that PSC was authorized to impose the SRM fee 
on member-regulated electric cooperatives; (2) held that full-service 
customers were not exempted from the SRM fee; and (3) that PSC’s did not 
act unreasonably or unlawfully when calculating the SRM fee imposed on 
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SELECTED TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS DECISIONS 
Mergers and Acquisitions 
D. Delaware 
Richie v. Hillstone Envtl. Partners, No. 19-649-RGA-SRF, 2019 WL 
2995178 (D. Del. July 9, 2019).  
Transferor company and Transferee company entered into an Asset Purchase 
Agreement (“APA”) for the sale of an environmental management services 
company (“Business”). The APA required Transferee to pay Transferor 
Earnout Payments based on Transferee’s Earnout Statements for 2016, 2017, 
and 2018. Transferee’s Earnout Statements for 2016 and 2017 reflected a 
loss. Therefore, Transferor paid Transferee nothing in Earnout Payments. 
Transferor alleged Transferee misrepresented the Earnout Statements. 
Accordingly, Transferor brought an action for fraud alleging Transferee 
diverted Business earnings to other companies in violation of the APA. 
Transferee moved to dismiss the complaint for two reasons. First, provisions 
in the APA permitted Transferor to request more information regarding the 
Earnout Statements within 30 days of receipt. Transferor failed to assert 
contractual rights in a timely fashion and therefore waived rights to recourse 
pursuant to the APA. Second, the Economic Loss Doctrine (“Doctrine”) 
precludes Transferor from recovering on the tort of fraud because the 
Doctrine prohibits recovery in tort for risks negotiated by contract. In turn, 
Transferor maintained that the APA did not expressly preclude recovery for 
tortious actions. Moreover, Transferor alleged the Doctrine is not applicable 
to the APA because Transferee fraudulently misrepresented the Earnout 
Statements inducing Transferor to waive contractual rights of recourse. The 
court rejected Transferor’s arguments and granted Transferee’s motion to 
dismiss. Contrary to Transferor’s theory that the APA did not prohibit tort 
recovery, the court noted the contract expressly provided mechanisms to 
serve as the “sole recourse” for disputes between the parties. The court 
addressed the Doctrine noting that exceptions for fraud may only be invoked 
where the contract was fraudulently induced. Transferee’s alleged fraud 
occurred in the performance of the contract therefore the Doctrine prohibits 
Transferor from recovery.  
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Patents and Intellectual Property 
 
Court of International Trade 
Bell Supply Co. v. United States, No. 14-00066, 2019 WL 3453276 (Ct. 
Int’l Trade July 22, 2019). 
 
This case considered the United States Department of Commerce’s 
(Commerce) remand redetermination that occurred as a result of “Bell V,” 
which remanded the application of the substantial transformation test 
regarding the scope of goods, particularly certain oil country tubular goods 
(OCTG) from China. The substantial transformation test weighs five factors 
in order to determine the country of origin for an imported article. These 
factors include: (1) the class or kind of merchandise; (2) the nature and 
sophistication of processing in the country of exportation; (3) the product 
properties, essential component of the merchandise, and intended end-use; 
(4) the cost of production/value added; and (5) the level of investment. 
Commerce employed the reasoning that many of the OCTGs are subject to a 
common heat treatment process, and that nothing distinguishes the 
equipment used throughout the industry. Because of these findings, the court 
held that Commerce’s totality-of-the-circumstances determination is 
supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, because the physical and 
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Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 931 F.3d 339 (4th Cir. 
2019).  
 
Environmental Group sued the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) in 
response to a Biological Opinion and Incidental Take Statement that FWS 
issued concerning the building of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline. The proposed 
pipeline would transport natural gas from West Virginia to Virginia and 
North Carolina. Because of the pipeline’s length, its construction would 
require a great deal of land and resources to be utilized, which could 
potentially harm a variety of species.   Environmental Group alleged that the 
opinions issued by the FWS improperly determined that pipeline 
construction would not jeopardize four endangered species—the rusty 
patched bumble bee, clubshell, Indiana bat, and Madison Cave Isopod. 
Moreover, Environmental Group argued that the opinions rendered by FWS 
were arbitrary and capricious. In evaluating Environmental Group’s claim 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit looked to the 
Endangered Species Act, which prohibits federal agencies from engaging in 
any action “likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered 
species or threatened species.” Moreover, under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), federal agencies must review relevant data in issuing 
statements and may not render them arbitrarily, capriciously, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law. The court held that because FWS had issued their 
Biological Opinion and Incidental Take Statement counter to available 
evidence; without regarding the species’ status as a whole; and without 
consider the pipeline’s overall impact on the endangered species that FWS’s 
actions were arbitrary and capricious. As a result, the court approved the 
petition and vacated the 2018 Biological Opinion and Take Statement. 
 
D. Arizona 
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. CV-17-00475-
TUC-JAS, 2019 WL 3503330 (D. Ariz. July 31, 2019). 
 
Agency granted Mining Company permit to begin the operation and 
development of a large open pit mine located within federal land. 
Environmental Group filed suit seeking injunction to stop the mining 
activities alleging Agency’s decision to grant the permit was arbitrary and 
capricious to numerous federal statutes. The court found that the Agency 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
400 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 5 
  
 
failed to in numerous regards to support its finding that permitting the mine 
would not be contrary to federal statutes and regulations. The court reasoned 
that according to the record the that Mining Company’s unpatented mining 
claims were never proved to be valid and without a valid unpatented mining 
claim Mining Company had no rights to develop the minerals within federal 
land or utilize the surface for that use. The court overruled Agency’s decision 
to grant the permit and remanded it back to Agency for further review. 
 
D. Connecticut 
Norwalk Harbor Keeper v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., No. 3:18-cv-0091 (SRU), 
2019 WL 2931641 (D. Conn. July 8, 2019).  
 
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) creates a private right of action for 
plaintiffs to challenge agency determinations that do not comply with the 
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). Environmental Group 
brought a private right of action to enjoin disbursement of federal funds for 
the replacement of the Norwalk River Bridge (“River Bridge”) until the U.S. 
Department of Transportation (“DOT”) completed an adequate Environment 
Analysis (“EA”) pursuant to the requirements of NEPA. The court found the 
Environmental Group lacked standing and, in the alternative, granted 
summary judgment in favor of DOT on the merits. Additionally, the court 
found the Environmental Group failed to satisfy the first requirement of 
standing: injury. An injury satisfies Article III standing requirements if it is 
concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical. Environmental Group failed to demonstrate how the DOT’s 
allegedly non-compliant decision-making process would result in injury to 
the Environmental Group’s recreational and aesthetic enjoyment of the area. 
+In the alternative the court granted DOT’s motion for summary judgment. 
The court analyzed the DOT’s assessment of the River Bridge through the 
arbitrary and capricious standard. Under the arbitrary and capricious 
standard, a court will affirm the agency’s decision making if the processes 
have some rational basis. The court found a rational basis for the DOT’s 
decision making and concluded the DOT’s processes were NEPA compliant. 
NEPA requires an EA to be thorough and not improperly segmented. 
Therefore, an agency may not circumvent NEPA requirements by 
fractionally analyzing the impacts of a project. The court found the DOT’s 
EA of the River Bridge adequately examined impacts and was not 
segmented. The DOT narrowed the scope of their project, considered 
alternatives, responded to public comments, conducted a thorough EA, and 
arrived at a rationally based plan to construct the River Bridge. 
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D. District of Columbia 
WildEarth Guardians v. Bernhardt, No. 16-1724(RC), 2019 WL 3253685 
(D.D.C. July 19, 2019) 
 
Environmental Group brought suit under the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA) challenging the Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) issuance 
of 473 oil and gas leases spanning three states—Wyoming, Colorado, and 
Utah. The focus of this case centers around the Environmental Group’s two 
further motions to amend a minute order from May 29, 2019 to enjoin BLM 
from issuing permits to drill on Colorado and Utah leases. Moreover, 
Environmental Group sought to enforce a remand order from March 19, 2019 
which remanded Wyoming leases to BLM for analysis and enjoined lease 
activities in Wyoming until BLM cured the deficiencies. In considering 
Environmental Group’s Motion to Amend May 29, 2019 Minute Order, the 
court applied the Rule 54(b) standard for reconsideration of interlocutory 
motions in assessing claims. Under this standard, Environmental Group had 
to demonstrate (1) an intervening change in the law; (2) the discovery of new 
evidence not previously available; or (3) a clear error in the first order. The 
court articulated that the minute order did not contain a “clear error” because 
BLM did not admit that Colorado and Utah’s lease activities were deficient. 
Moreover, Environmental Group argued that there may be irreparable 
damage, but the court conceded that a preliminary injunction should have 
been filed rather than an amendment to a minute order. For those reasons, the 
court denied Environmental Group’s motion to amend the May 29, 2019-
minute order. In considering Environmental Group’s separate filing to 
enforce the March 19, 2019 remand order, the court articulated the rule that 
a prevailing plaintiff has to demonstrate that a defendant has not complied 
with a judgment entered against it. Here, Environmental Group failed 
because all relief required by the remand order was accomplished. 
Consequently, the court denied Environmental Group’s motion to amend the 
May 29, 2019-minute order and denied its motion to enforce the March 19, 
2019 remand order. 
 
D. New Jersey 
Stahl v. Bauer Auto., Inc., No. CV 15-361 (SRC), 2019 WL 3712175 
(D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2019). 
 
This case is a recovery action for clean-up costs brought under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 
1980 (“CERCLA”). Stakeholders were individuals with interest in a property 
(“MCP”) owned by Manufacturing Company. The Adjacent Property was 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
402 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 5 
  
 
owned by Adjacent Property Owners. Stakeholders sold their interest in MCP 
to a third party via a Stock Purchase Agreement.  The sale triggered a 
remediation obligation under New Jersey statutory law. In a dispute that 
resulted in an arbitration agreement, Stakeholders transferred their obligation 
to complete and control clean up procedures to MCP’s new owners. In 
exchange, Manufacturing Company would be reimbursed by Stakeholders 
for remediation expenses. One of the remediation efforts that Manufacturing 
Company undertook unearthed a specific contamination on MCP Adjacent 
Property Owners caused. Subsequently, Stakeholders sued Adjacent 
Property Owners for recovery costs under CERCLA, but lost on all claims. 
The district court held that Stakeholders lacked standing to sue under 
CERCLA. Under CERCLA, a private party that incurs remediation expenses 
can recover cost. In this case however, Stakeholders did not assume any clean 
up obligation, and as such did not personally incur any remediation expense. 
Instead, Stakeholders had an indemnity agreement, where Stakeholders 
would pay for the remediation cost personally incurred by another party. 
Since the remediation cost was not incurred by Stakeholders, and because a 
private party who has not been sued under CERCLA cannot ask for a 
contribution claim under it, the district court granted summary judgement in 
favor of Adjacent Property Owners.  
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state (or federal) court 
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.  
 
S.D. Texas 
Yuen v. Triple B Servs. LLP, No. H-18-3277, 2019 WL 3069791 (S.D. Tex. 
July 8, 2019).  
 
Property Owner brought suit against Development Contractor alleging 
Development Contractor unlawfully damaged Property Owner’s real 
property in violation of state and federal laws. Development Contractor 
dumped hundreds of thousands of cubic yards of soil on Property Owner’s 
property without authorization. As a result of this dumping, Property Owner 
alleged, the flood plain of the property changed. During Hurricane Harvey, 
resulting floods on the property caused flood water to accumulate and 
damage dikes surrounding oil tanks on the property. Property Owner further 
alleged that this illegal dumping is the proximate cause of oil spills that 
damaged the soil in the wake of the hurricane. Property Owner alleged this 
dumping violated the Resource Conservation Recovery Act (“RCRA”) and 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability 
Act (“CERCLA”). CERCLA and RCRA impose liability for persons who 
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improperly handle and dispose of hazardous materials. The court granted 
Development Contractor’s motion to dismiss these claims because, while the 
soil dumping allegedly resulted in oil contamination, soil itself is not a 
hazardous waste within the meaning of CERCLA and RCRA. Property 
Owner also sought recovery for violations of the RICO statute. To 
successfully recover for a RICO claim, plaintiff must, inter alia, allege 
defendant engaged in predicate acts of interstate racketeering and derived 
income from this pattern of racketeering.  Property Owner’s complaint 
included only conclusory allegations of fraud and failed to allege with any 
particularity that Development Contractor committed predicate acts of 
racketeering. Accordingly, the court dismissed all federal claims of Property 
Owner and elected not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Property 
Owner’s state claims. 
 
D. Utah 
WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, No. 2:16-cv-00168-DN, 2019 WL 2929732 
(D. Utah July 8, 2019).  
 
In 2002 Coal Mining Company (“CMC”) applied for a coal mining lease on 
federal lands in Utah. In accordance with requirements of the Mineral 
Leasing Act (“MLA”) and National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 
the Bureau of Land Management (“Bureau”) issued a Final Environmental 
Impact Statement (“FEIS”) on the proposed lease. Bureau approved the lease. 
CMC abandoned the lease in 2002 but expressed interest around ten years 
later. In 2015, Bureau relied on the FEIS produced in 2002 and again 
approved the lease for development. Environmental Group brought this 
action against Bureau to supplement the administrative record and conduct 
limited fact discovery. Environmental Group contends that Bureau must 
update the administrative record to include data relevant to the lease 
approval. Generally, courts assume the administrative record is proper. 
Exceptions to this rule are rare. The court may find a record deficient if the 
record fails to include data on which the agency action was premised, or the 
record ignores relevant factors that should have been considered by the 
agency. The court reasoned the FEIS contemplated or should have 
contemplated the fair market value of the lease, a report on the greater sage-
grouse in the region, and air quality permits and emission data. Therefore, 
the court required the record to be supplemented with regard to these exhibits. 
However, the court denied Environmental Group’s motion to supplement the 
record as to other exhibits related to negative impacts of the greater sage-
grouse, climate change, and greenhouse gases as these factors are not 
essential to Bureau’s approval process. Additionally, the court  denied 
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Environmental Group’s request to conduct limited discovery to supplement 






Highway 68 Coal. v. Cty. of Monterey, No. H045253, 2019 WL 3369837 
(Cal. Ct. App. July 26, 2019). 
 
Social Welfare Organization (“SWO”) and Environmental Organization 
(“EO”) challenged the district court’s dismissal of their claims against 
Monterey County (“County”), on the approval of the Development Project 
(“Project”). Project was a proposal by County to develop a residential 
subdivision. County circulated a drafted Environmental Impact Report (EIR) 
for public review then prepared a finalized version, after taking the public 
comments into account. SWO and EO lost on all issues asserted, some of 
which included: (1) the project description for Project and EIR alternative 
analysis did not comply with California Environmental Quality Act 
(“CEQA”); and (2) recirculation of the EIR is required in light of the changes 
made. First, the California Court of Appeals held that the description for 
Project was adequate under CEQA because the basic attributes of the project 
remained unchanged. The changes listed in the EIR were made to reduce 
environmental impacts, a goal encouraged by the CEQA process. 
Furthermore, SWO’s claim that EIR analysis does not comply with the 
CEQA because it failed to analyze a reasonable range of alternatives is 
untenable. An EIR need not consider every conceivable alternative to a 
project. The EIR alternatives listed by County were sufficiently within 
reason. Second, the appellate court concluded that recirculation of the 
finalized EIR is not mandated because the changes made were merely adding 
new information that clarified the previous version of the EIR. There were 
no changes made that would substantially impact the environment. As such, 
the court affirmed the trial court’s decision denying judgment and dismissing 
the petition. 
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state (or federal) court 








Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Perennial Solar, LLC, 212 A.3d 868 (Md. 2019). 
 
This case brought local Maryland zoning ordinances into conflict with a state 
scheme promoting solar energy generation. The court focused its question on 
whether Maryland’s state statutory scheme preempted local zoning authority 
regarding the certification of solar energy-generating systems (“SEGS”). 
Energy Company initially sought an application for a SEGS, which the 
County Zoning Board (“Board”) approved. Perturbed landowners sought 
judicial review, Board intervened, and the Company filed a motion 
determining whether state law had preempted the County’s authority on the 
subject matter. The court considered whether “state law preempt[s] local 
zoning authority with respect to solar energy generating systems that require 
a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity issued by the Maryland 
Public Service Commission.” The court determined that the state statutory 
scheme impliedly preempted local zoning authority with respect to the 
SEGS. In examining whether state law has impliedly preempted local laws, 
the court examines a variety of factors to determine whether the General 
Assembly has enacted such a strong statutory scheme that its intent to oust 
local authority must be implied. Among those considerations is the 
pervasiveness of the regulations, whether any concurrent authority is 
expressly delegated, and whether the statute addresses local authority’s role 
in the scheme. Here, the General Assembly’s clearly intended the state Public 
Service Commission (“PCS”) to have the final and exclusive authority in 
approving SEGS. The statute required the PCS to seek counsel and consider 
the recommendations of local zoning authorities while limiting local 
authority to a mere advisory role. Additionally, the legislative history showed 
that the General Assembly had ample opportunity to amend the statute so that 
PCS had concurrent authority with local zoning boards, but the General 
Assembly rejected this approach. 
 
New Jersey 
In re Adoption of Amendments to N.J.A.C. 14:8-1.2, No. A-4163-16T1, 
2019 WL 3428515 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 30, 2019). 
 
Solar Energy Provider appealed amendments made to two regulations by the 
New Jersey Board of Public Utilities (“BPU”) related to State law requiring 
utilities to increase their utilization of renewable energy sources. Electricity 
suppliers producing electricity could either generate their own renewable 
energy or purchase certificates generated by renewable energy suppliers. 
Solar Energy Provider argued that BPU’s proposed amendments made it 
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more difficult for solar facilities to generate these certificates. The court 
rejected Solar Energy Provider’s arguments that BPU exceeded its statutory 
authority and that the BPU amendments were arbitrary and capricious. The 
court held that BPU’s amendments were promulgated under its broad 
statutory authority, the harm identified by Solar Energy Provider would not 
be triggered by the amendments because they were narrowly tailored, and 
that Solar Energy Provider could not supplement the record on appeal after 
failing to comply with notice and comment procedures. For these reasons, 
the court upheld the amendments.  
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state (or federal) court 
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
In re N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. CAFRA Permit No. 0000-15-000.71 CAF 
150001, No. A-3293-16T1, 2019 WL 3282625 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
July 22, 2019).  
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should 
be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
Individuals, along with an Environmental Organization (EO), challenged the 
issuance of a permit under the Coastal Area Facility Review Act (CAFRA) 
and the Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act (FWPA) by the New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection (Department) to New Jersey 
Natural Gas Company (Gas) that would disturb freshwater and wetlands 
areas. Gas appealed the standing of the parties. Individuals were found to not 
have proper standing, as they did not have sufficient stake in the outcome. 
However, the court found that EO had proper standing because of its stated 
goal of studying and conserving marine life and habitats. Before issuing such 
a permit, the Commissioner of the Department must meet statutory standards 
that EO has claimed were not met. The statutory standards are: (1) air, water, 
and radiation emissions; (2) prevention of effluents in excess of the recovery 
abilities of the area; (3) collection of trash and litter; (4) minimal interference 
of regenerative natural water supplies; (5) minimal interference with plant 
and animal life in the area; (6) no endangering human welfare; and (7) 
minimal degradation of the area. Department invited public comments and 
consulted with various state and federal regulatory agencies to meet the 
statutory standards. Department also issued a nine-page environmental 
report. Despite EO’s assertions, Department need not respond and address 
each individual comment left during the comment period. The only 
requirement is to address each of the factors. Review of administrative 
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decisions is merely to determine if there is sufficient evidence to justify the 
determination. Great deference is given to these type of agency decisions. 
Department fulfilled its statutory requirements for the proper issuance of the 
permit. 
 
US Masters Residential Prop. (USA) Fund v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. 
A-78 Sept. Term 2017081137, 2019 WL 3402917 (N.J. July 29, 2019).  
 
Property Owner appealed an arbitration decision to the New Jersey Supreme 
Court denying Spill Compensation Fund money after a hurricane carried and 
deposited oil onto Property Owner’s private property. The Court held that 
Arbitrator’s conclusion denying funds should be called into question because 
(1) Arbitrator’s summary of expert testimony was based on a 
misrepresentation of evidence taken out of context and thus sufficient to 
render the decision arbitrary and capricious; and (2) Arbitrator prevented 
Property Owner from introducing expert testimony to counteract the 
evidence that was shared with them last minute, which undermined the 
fairness of the proceeding. For these reasons, the Court vacated Arbitrator’s 
decision and remanded for new arbitration proceedings. 
 
New York 
Mamakating v. Bloomingburg, 174 A.D.3d 1175, 105 N.Y.S.3d 611 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2019). 
 
Town brought suit against Village to annul Village’s reaffirmation of 
Company’s real estate development plants. In 2009, an environmental impact 
statement was created for Village to consider when approving the 
development plans. Village accepted the environmental impact statement 
findings in 2010 and affirmed Company’s plans. Town rescinded the 
affirmation in 2016 pursuant to a municipal agreement that gave Town the 
powers of Village’s Board, the body that initially approved the 
environmental impact statement and development plans. Town brought suit, 
alleging that Village lacked the authority to reaffirm; Village argued that 
Town lacked standing to bring suit. The lower court found for Village and 
dismissed Town’s claim. Town appeals. Without considering the standing 
issue, this Court held that Village had the requisite authority and that the 
reaffirmation was not arbitrary or capricious, such that the lower court 
properly dismissed Town. Village considered the impact of stormwater, 
increased water usage, effects on traffic flow, and other issues when 
reconsidering the development plans. Village had authority to reconsider the 
initial development plans because “the particulars of the amendment were 
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embraced within the original referral;” thus, Village did not have to refer the 
matter to Town in 2016. 
 
North Dakota 
Newfield Expl. Co. v. State ex rel. N.D. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 2019 
ND 193, 931 N.W.2d 478. 
 
Company, lessee, brought suit against State, lessor, seeking a declaration that 
natural gas lease royalties be calculated based on proceeds from the sale of 
gas minus costs associated with making the gas marketable (aka, post-
production costs). Company’s lease states that royalties shall be based on 
“gross production or the market value thereof . . . such value to be determined 
by . . . gross proceeds of sale.” State discovered that Company was paying 
royalties equal to the gross proceeds minus the post-production costs when 
State audited Company. State contends that this calculation runs afoul of the 
express lease terms. Company maintains that it has paid royalties calculated 
on gross proceeds because it sells the gas to a third party, which refines then 
sells the gas. Third party then pays Company approximately seventy to eighty 
percent of the final resale price. Applying contract interpretation law, the 
Court acknowledged that, generally, lessors and lessees split post-production 
costs. However, parties may allocate the obligation of making gas 
marketable. The term “gross proceeds” in oil and gas contracts means 
royalties based on the amount gas sold for after production, without splitting 
post-production costs. Conversely, “net proceeds” indicates that the lessor 
and lessee will share in post-production costs. Based on the plain language 




Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Pennsylvania, No. 228 M.D. 2012, 2019 WL 
3402922 (Pa. Commw. Ct. July 29, 2019). 
 
Environmental Organization brought action against State after State 
appropriated money collected from rental and bonus payments made on oil 
and gas leases located on state-owned forest land. Environmental 
Organization alleges that, pursuant to the Pennsylvania Constitution, such 
money should be part of the corpus of an environmental public trust. On 
remand from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, both parties brought cross-
applications for summary relief. While proceeds from the removal and sale 
of natural resources constitutes the corpus of such a trust, the royalties and 
bonus payments at issue here were merely made in exchange for the right to 
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explore for resources and in consideration for executing the lease, not for the 
removal of the resources. However, State law, at the time, also provided that 
two-thirds of any rental proceeds is to be considered as principal and must be 
paid back into the corpus and the other third is to be considered income. Thus, 
the court concluded that only two-thirds of the rental and bonus payments 
were required to be designated as the corpus and the State’s appropriation of 
the remaining third to the general fund was not unconstitutional since income 
does not have to remain in the corpus. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
